In the last few weeks, we have seen that jump in volatility is not the feature of equity markets only. Namely, sovereign yields around the world increased rapidly and surprised many investors. Central banks reacted on the sharp increase although some of them (Fed) seem to be reluctant doing more than just saying that they will not tighten its policy soon. In this article we are looking at the drivers of the surprising yield jump and what to expect further.
In December 2020, it seemed like both ECB and Fed could go on autopilot for the 2021, keeping their reference rates at the bottom and continuing with their asset purchases. In December inflation was already a hot theme as there were camps saying that massive fiscal stimulus in US could drive inflation much higher than 2.0% while other camp was saying that we could only see short-term bump in the second quarter of 2021 and then back to inflation being subdued. However, inflation expectations in US kept rising strongly and one of the most famous measures (5y5y inflation swap) overjumped 2.40% in the beginning of February, the level last time seen in beginning of 2018. On the other side of the Atlantic, EUR 5y5y inflation swap reached 1.35% which is still way below 2020 levels of 1.80%.
Source: Bloomberg, InterCapital
Two months ago, at the beginning of 2021, 10Y Treasury was still below 1.0% but after the Democrats confirmed their victory in Georgia on January 5th, markets started to price large fiscal stimulus and 10Y yield increased by 20bps in a matter of a week and traded in a range of 1.0% and 1.20% for a whole month. However, on February 17th US retail sales data took investors by surprise as January they increased by more than 7.0% compared to the same month last year. After mentioned release, sell-off of treasuries accelerated as investors were calculating whether large fiscal stimulus, increase of savings and better than expected vaccine efficacy (which should accelerate opening of the economy) could pull inflation to the much higher levels than previously anticipated. Besides all the above-mentioned factors, investors’ expectations on Fed’s rates changed, meaning that at the moment market prices that Fed could hike its rates sooner than expected, i.e. already next year.
US Treasury yields continued to climb in the end of February despite Jerome Powell’s comments on his semi-annual testimony on which he stated that “the economy is a long way from our employment and inflation goals and is likely to take some time for substantial further progress.”. Furthermore, Fed’s governor said that inflation could overjump 2.0% in the short term and Fed will not blink an eye as they do not expect elevated levels to be with us for long, reminding the committee that we did not have high inflation for the last 40 years.
Nevertheless, on February 25th sell-off went full-on, with US 10Y rising from 1.37% at the open to above 1.60% intra day before closing at 1.52%. Main driver of such an abrupt selling was that on the same day, auction of 7Y UST had the lowest bid to cover ratio on the record and primary dealers had to take almost 40% of total auction. Since then, US 10Y yield stabilized to 1.40%-1.45% range although it still seems like it has room for rising once again.
As USD yield curve bear-steepened, EUR curve followed. As shown on the chart 1. inflation expectations surged in US while EUR 5y5y is still below the levels seen in the beginning of 2020 which seems reasonable due to several factors. European Union’s fiscal stimulus was way smaller compared to package in US, GDP gap seems to be bigger and 2019 GDP could be reached only in 2022 compared to 2021 in US while euros strength is another headwind for eurozone’s inflation. Despite all said, EUR curve bear steepened as well and on February 25th 10Y EUR benchmark reached -0.20% compared to -0.55% in the beginning of 2021. The main difference between Fed and ECB on the matter of this sharp increase of yields was that ECB’s officials were very loud and clear saying that such a tightening in EUR long dated rates is not desirable in this recovery phase which stabilized EUR curve. On February 26th EUR 10-30Y spread tightened, most likely as a result of ECB buying more long-dated papers under its flexible PEPP program. Because of ECB’s message, this week yields on both sides of the Atlantic seem to be stabilized after several weeks of rising. That could be seen on implied volatility on treasury futures options which in the end of February rose to the levels last time seen in March 2020 and are now back close to their multiyear average although still being a bit elevated.
So, where do we go from now? It seems that ECB will not let yields and spreads to rise, especially at a pace seen in February and they will use its PEPP program in any way they see it appropriate while they could also increase the envelope furthermore (EUR 1.850bn at the moment). Despite we expect inflation to continue rising in Europe due to base effects at least, which would then decrease real yields, we do not expect EUR nominal yields to increase much this year even in case USD curve starts rising once again. On the other side, we easily see USD curve bear-steepening further due to all the factors mentioned before but also due to central bank neglecting inflation in the long run. Although we expect inflation in US to calm after the base effects (in 2022), markets could react violently once again when they see inflation at 3.0% or 4.0%, calling central bank to step in.
Source: Bloomberg, InterCapital
For today, we decided to bring you an updated overview of the indebtedness and capital structure of Croatian companies using FY 2020 results.
As all Croatian blue chips published their preliminary FY 2020 results, we decided to observe how indebted are the companies are by comparing net debt to EBITDA and % of debt financing. We also added how much additional debt these companies could take in order to reach 3x EBITDA.
Note that Adris Grupa and ZABA were excluded from the overview as Adris operates as a holding, while ZABA is a bank.
Net Debt/ EBITDA
Among observed companies Končar, HT and Ericsson Nikola Tesla operate at a negative net debt, meaning their cash position (short term financial assets + cash and cash equivalents) exceed their financial debt. Besides that, Arena Hospitality Group reported a negative EBITDA (HRK -49.1m), so it is not included in the list above. At the same time, Arena’s net debt stands at HRK 977.7m.
Unsurprisingly, two tourist companies lead the list with the highest indebtedness (of the observed companies). Valamar Riviera operates currently with a net debt/EBITDA of as much as 27.6x. In 2020, Valamar reported a plunge in sales of 70 % YoY as a result of significantly lower tourist activity during this summer season, due to pandemic and international lock-down. As a consequence, the company’s EBITDA in the first 2020, amounted to HRK 102m, representing a decrease of 87%.
Maistra comes next, with a net debt/EBITDA of 11.2x, as the company’s EBITDA decreased by 74% in 2020.
On the flip side, three food companies have the lowest indebtedness of the observed companies. To be specific, Atlantic Group operates with a net debt/EBITDA of 1.0x followed by Kraš with 1.1x and Podravka with 1.3x.
We also observed how much additional debt companies could take to reach 3x EBITDA which is in the region considered as a breaking point and red flag in terms of indebtedness.
This analysis provides information on the companies’ potentials for takeovers, but also the potential for an internal growth through additional borrowing. It’s important to point out that companies with net debt above 3x EBITDA are not necessarily too indebted as not all them are equal and their industries differ (and the other way around – certain industries are not prone to hold any leverage). Note that for this we excluded tourist companies from the calculation.
Potential Additional Debt (HRK m) to Reach 3x EBITDA
Turning our attention to the capital structure, of the observed companies, 9 of 12 are mostly equity funded. Of those, HT leads the list with 97.4% equity, followed with Končar 92%. On the flip side, Optima Telekom and Dalekovod are almost entirely debt funded with a capital structure of 93% and 87%, respectively.
Capital Structure of Croatian Companies
Telekom Slovenije provided clarification regarding the lawsuit from T-2 worth EUR 49.7m.
Telekom Slovenije announced on Tuesday that they have received from the Ljubljana District Court a lawsuit from T-2 for the payment of general damages in the amount of EUR 12.2m, for the payment of loss of profit in the amount of EUR 35.8m and for non-existence of claims in the amount of EUR 1.8m plus interest, fees and charges. The claim is said to represent the damage that the plaintiff is said to have suffered in the period from 1 September 2018 to 31 July 2020.
Yesteday, Telekom Slovenije has followed up by stating that T-2 primarily establishes its claim on allegations of alleged illegal actions of Telekom Slovenije on the wholesale market of local access at a fixed location, on the wholesale market of central access at a fixed location for mass market products, and on the wholesale market of high-quality access at a fixed location.
T-2 calls for alleged violations of regulatory decisions, issued by the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia, with an alleged abuse of dominant position and concluding limiting agreements by forming non-cost-based prices for individual wholesale services (violation of obligation of ensuring economic repeatability, performing margin squeeze), with alleged violations of the obligation of equal treatment, and by allegedly forming unfair business terms and conditions.
Telekom Slovenije, further added that they operate in accordance with the valid legislation and good business practices and will prove during the course of these procedures that the claim is completely unfounded.